Western Sahara Conflict Negotiation

Western Sahara Negotiation convened by Massad Fares Boulos, senior advisor to president Donald Trump for Arab and African Affairs, in Madrid on 8 and 9 February and Washington on 23 and 24 February 2026. Both meetings were chaired by Mr Boulos and attended by the UN Secretary-General’s envoy for Western Sahara, Mr Staffan de Mistura, and Mike Waltz, USA Ambassador at United Nations. Long entrenched in its absolute refusal to participate in negotiations, the Algerian Govenment has now resigned itself to joining the negotiating table under pressure from Washington and the Security Council, and was represented by its Foreign Minister, Mr Ahmed Attaf. Also attending were Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Mr Nasser Bourita, the Mauritanian Foreign Minister, Mr Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, and Polisario Front represented by Mr Mohamed Yeslem Beissat, and their officials.

The negotiations on the autonomy were held behind closed doors in total secrecy. There was no official photo, and no joint statement.

The next Meeting is scheduled for May 2026. The office of the Convenor, the Secretary-General’s envoy for Western Sahara, Mr Staffan and Morocco hope to reach an agreement before the renewal of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Mandate at the end of October 2026. Morocco and the United States are against any further renewal of the Minurso Mandate.

We reported the first meeting in our last Newsletter on 8 February, as did Spanish press and various media World Wide on 9 February, but in Algeria only one short piece in Le Soir d’Algérie on 9 February informed its readers that “a meeting has taking place in Madrid between Morocco and Polisario”. Other National Media such as Algérie Presse Service, and El Moudjahid did not report that the meetings had taken place in Madrid and Washington, despite Algerian Foreign Minister, Mr Ahmed Attaf, attending. Perhaps the reason is due to the fact that since President Abdelmadjid Tebboune became President of Algeria on 19 December 2019, he reiterated on every occasion with Algerian media his country’s unwavering support for the Sahrawi cause to self-determination and that his government will not take part in any negotiation. The reason for this U-turn of Algeria’s is due to the meeting between President Tebboune and Mr Massad Fares Boulos, inbriefed President Tebboune about the meeting he intends to convene on Western Sahara conflict under The UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025 in Madrid. Also attending were the Chief of Staff at the Presidency of the Republic Boualem Boualem, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Community Abroad and African Affairs, Ahmed Attaf, Minister of State, Minister of Hydrocarbons and Mines, Mohamed Arkab, the Advisor to the President, in charge of Diplomatic Affairs, Amar Abba, and Algeria’s ambassador to Washington Sabri Boukadoum.

Mr Bolous invited Algeria as well as the Polisario movement to attend.

Mr Boulos, gave a Press conference after his meeting the President and he said that “I discussed with the President how to increase trade relations, original security, and Global Terrorism, particularly, in the Sahel region.

The latest contact between Mr Bolous and President Tebboune was on 22 March 2026 and according to the communique issued by President Office: “President Abdelmadjid Tebboune received a phone call on Saturday(22/03) from Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the US president, from Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the US president”, “During the phone call, they also discussed Algerian-American relations and reviewed the latest developments in the global situation,” the statement read.

The POLISARIO, movement with the support of President Houari Boumédiénne (1927-1978) founded The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic which he recognised on 6 March, 1976, marking the first such endorsement and enabling the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic government in exile, and viewed the Polisario as a partner in regional anti-imperialist efforts. President Houari Boumédiénne provided the most significant early recognition and enabled establishment of an embassy in Algiers and providing military training, logistical support, and refugee hosting in Tindouf, which was driven largely by anti-imperialist alignments, socialist-leaning governments in Africa and non-aligned movement members, reflecting geopolitical alignments. Indeed, Algeria under Boumédiénne became a haven for revolutionaries, including the US Black Panthers and notorious Carlos the Jackal terrorist groups. These liberation groups, including Polisario, even received Algerian passports that allowed them to travel internationally as representatives of movements, not fugitives.

Between 1976 and 1982, and with the help of Algeria, over 80 countries recognised Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, but this is simply an ideological recognition and there is no trade or any other form of commercial exchange between these countries and Polisario, and from 1982 onward, a wave of derecognitions diminished the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Algeria’s hope for Independence. As of December 2025, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic maintains formal recognition with just 20.
Having lost international support and various nations’ support, Algerian accepted Morocco’s autonomy proposal is “the only one that can lead to a final and just solution”, particularly since France, Spain, United Kingdom and The United Nations supported Morocco’s autonomy proposal.

With the Middle East and Morocco’s increasingly close ties with the United States, President Tebboune wants to avoid any conflict during the remaining three years of Trump’s term and accepted meeting Mr Massad Fares Boulos, senior advisor to president Donald Trump for Arab and African Affairs, on 27 July 2027, to discuss how to improve relations between Algeria and the US. In fact his Ambassador in Washington, Mr Sabri Boukadoum who has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 31 March 2019 to 7 July 2021 and Ambassador to the United States since Feb 2024, began his government’s new rapprochement with a series of meetings with the US business community as well as Defense and military representatives in the U.S. in February 2025. However, he is facing problems. (1) Algerian military stock is mainly Russian made; and (2) for over two decade, any foreign investment in Algeria, the “51/49” rule applies. This law required foreign companies to partner with a local Algerian entity that had to own at least 51% of the share capital. This was a significant barrier, but this was abolished in 2020 for non-strategic sectors as part of a government plan to encourage foreign investors. A new Investment Law, No. 22-18, dated 24 July 2022, is at the heart of this effort to grow the economy beyond the oil and gas sector, which is mainly driven by hydrocarbons and public investment since independence.

What are the restrictions on foreign ownership of businesses in Algeria under the new Investment Law, and how can these be navigated?
These Restrictions on foreign ownership of companies in Algeria concerns Five strategic sectors that remain subject to the “49/51%” rule, mandating the establishment of partnerships with one or more Algerian entities holding at least 51% of the share capital:

  1. The military industry and related activities placed under the authority of the Ministry of National Defense.
  2. Railways, ports and airports.
  3. The pharmaceutical industry except for investments related to the manufacturing of essential, innovative, high value-added products which require complex and protected technology, intended for the domestic market and export.
  4. The exploitation of the national mining domain as well as all underground or surface resources relating to an extractive activity, except for quarries and sandpits of non-mineral products.
  5. The Oil & Gas upstream sector as well as operating the distribution network and transportation of electrical energy by cable and transportation of hydrocarbons (liquids and gas) by overhead or underground pipelines.
  6. Importation activities of raw materials and finished goods for resale in the same condition remain subject to the 49/51% rule in order to discourage the development of these costly activities for the Algerian external balance and to limit the transfers of foreign currencies outside Algeria.

To navigate these restrictions, foreign investors can explore the option of setting up a joint venture with one or more Algerian partners and entering into a shareholders’ agreement containing contractual mechanisms to give the foreign partner control over the management of the joint venture. However, financial rights remain limited to 49%.

President Tebboune makes U-turn and join Western Sahara Negotiation on Moroccan autonomy proposal
President Tebboune was subjected to significant pressure by Arab League member States, the U.S and the Secretary-General’s envoy for Western Sahara, Mr Staffan de Mistura pressure to join the negotiations, particularly as The UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, which stipulates that the Moroccan autonomy proposal is “the only one that can lead to a final and just solution”, and “UN expresses its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in their efforts to implement the Security Council resolutions and to advance the political process, including through continuation of consultations between the Personal Envoy and Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to build on the progress achieved”. Therefore:

(1). President Abdelmadjid Tebboune primarily wants to avoid finding himself isolated during the present crisis in the Middle East, particularly as Algeria and Iran still maintain close ties. He also wants to avoid incurring sanctions from Washington in response to Algiers’s purchase of Russian Su-35 and Su-57 fighter jets. In terms of Europe, Algiers is isolated after a series of diplomatic crises. For example, in July 2024 President Macron of France recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara dealing a blow to the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Similarly, Spain also acknowledged Morocco’s sovereignty on 19 March 2022. Algeria has also continued to be in conflict with Mali since 2020, and it has cut diplomatic ties with Morocco since 24 August 2021. Furthermore, The UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025 requested that Algeria participate in the negotiation.

(2). Polisario too have very little choice but to accept The UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, particularly, as international aid declining and the disengagement of foreign donors is worsening living conditions in the camps, “The contents of rations decreased by 30% between November 2023 and February 2025,” according to United Nations 2025 report. Furthermore, a sword hanging over Algiers’ head is a bill proposed by Senator Tom Cotton and Senator Rick Scott, currently under consideration in the US Congress to classify the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization; and for those few African countries who still recognise the Polisario Movement it is simply a burden on their countries. The UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, agreed that the only feasible resolution is an Autonomy Plan under Moroccan sovereignty. The priorities of international allies, including several states that have traditionally supported Algeria in southern Africa, are more focused on regional stability, rather than on a liberation struggle. Accordingly, the Algerian government and Polisario have found themselves in metaphorical isolation, striving to defend a case with no supporters other than inflexible official statements that do not reflect the reality on the ground.

The Creation of Autonomy for the region:
The 40-pages proposal plan for the creation of an autonomous region submitted by Morocco was originally offered by the King Hassan in 1980s and is similar to Germany “Länder”. However, due to Rifians populations and followers of Mohamed ben Abd el-Krim el-Khatabi (1882-1963) who founded an independent Republic, which governed the area 1921 to 1927, King Hassan was advised against it, because, the idea would open the door for the Rifian population to demand similar autonomy for their region too and so the government abandoned the idea.

The Autonomy proposed by Morocco to Polisario is as follows:

  1. The region will have its own local government, parliament, finance and judiciary.
  2. Morocco would retain control over sovereign powers: currency, defence, Internal Security, foreign policy, and symbols of sovereignty, such as National flag and anthem and oath of Allegiance to the King of Morocco.
  3. The King as Head of State, will nominate the head of the regional Government.
  4. “Reconciliation” and the return of refugees from camps run by the Polisario Front in Algeria.
  5. Disarmament of armed elements;
  6. Combatants and Polisario leadership will benefit from an “amnesty”.

Le Soir d’Algérie reported that Polisario will not accept giving up their flag and the appointment of the head of the regional Government, and Algeria wanted free access to the Atlantic Ocean through Western Sahara. King Mohammed VI has already offered this access to Algeria in the past.

Economic impact of refugees’ return will be huge on Moroccan health, housing, education and jobs creation, particularly, as the number of refugees in Algeria is unknown, and even the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees does not know how many refugees are in those camps in Algeria.

The first meeting on 8 February in Madrid was devoted to general discussion and setting up a Committee of experts.
Since Abdelmadjid Tebboune became President of Algeria on 19 December 2019, he reiterated on every occasion with Algerian media his country’s unwavering support for the Sahrawi cause to self-determination and that his government will not take part in any negotiation. This is a matter between Morocco and The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. However, during the last 10 years, many countries world wide have supported Morocco’s plan for “autonomy” rather than independence and the biggest blow to Algeria has been the recognition of Rabat’s autonomy plan by the US, Spain, France, United Kingdom.

Another supporter for Polisario is the South African government who recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) led by the Polisario Front in 2004 and the African National Congress (ANC) who retains control of the country’s diplomatic policy. However, South Africa has been under pressure from South African business companies to change course of its foreign policy. Last year, Mr Kopeng Obed Bapela, former South African Deputy Minister of Public Enterprises visited Morocco and he emphasised the importance of enhancing economic and commercial ties. He encouraged Moroccan companies to invest in South Africa and highlighted the presence of numerous South African businesses in the Moroccan market. At the end of his visit he publicly and unequivocally endorsed Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for the Sahara. However, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading a renewed effort to bolster the Polisario Front, even as the group’s influence and support wane across Africa. Backed by loyal allies in the African National Congress (ANC), Ramaphosa has orchestrated high-profile meetings with Polisario representatives to counter Morocco’s growing diplomatic success over Sahara.

Conclusion:

  1. For King Mohammed VI, ending this 50 years conflict will go down in North Africa history as greatest achievement for Maghrebi countries and will revitalise business between these Maghrebi countries and to revive the Maghreb Union project.
  2. For Algeria, President Tebboune will find it hard to explain his U-turn and accepting Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for the Sahara to Algerian Political Parties, Armed Forces and people.
  3. Polisario movement will significantly benefit from 50 years development of the region and
    will run their own local government and live in Peace.
  4. The Countries who still recognised Polisario Movement will no longer have a burden on their countries, particularly as this is simply ideological recognition and there was no trade or any business what so ever between them.

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